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Abstract: Autonomous systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), anti-
munitions systems, armed robots, cyber attack and cyber defense systems, are 
projected to become the centerpiece of 21st century military and counter-terrorism 
operations. This trend has challenged legal experts, policymakers and military 
ethicists to make sense of these developments within existing normative frameworks 
of international law and just war theory. This paper highlights a different yet equally 
profound ethical challenge: understanding how this trend may lead to a moral 
deskilling of the military profession, potentially destabilizing traditional norms 
of military virtue and their power to motivate ethical restraint in the conduct of 
war. Employing the normative framework of virtue ethics, I argue that professional 
ideals of military virtue such as courage, integrity, honor and compassion help to 
distinguish legitimate uses of military force from amoral, criminal or mercenary 
violence, while also preserving the conception of moral community needed to 
secure a meaningful peace in war’s aftermath. The cultivation of these virtues in a 
human being, however, presupposes repeated practice and development of skills of 
moral analysis, deliberation and action, especially in the ethical use of force. As in 
the historical deskilling of other professions, human practices critical to cultivating 
these skills can be made redundant by autonomous or semi-autonomous machines, 
with a resulting devaluation and/or loss of these skills and the virtues they facilitate. 
This paper explores the circumstances under which automated methods of warfare, 
including automated weapons and cyber systems, could lead to a dangerous ‘moral 
deskilling’ of the military profession. I point out that this deskilling remains a 
significant risk even with a commitment to ‘human on the loop’ protocols. I conclude 
by summarizing the potentially deleterious consequences of such an outcome, and 
reflecting on possible strategies for its prevention.
Keywords: automated methods, ethics, military virtue, professionalism, moral 
deskilling.
1. INTRODUCTION
Few images highlight the increasingly automated nature of modern warfare better 
than a photograph of the eerily opaque, windowless nose of the MQ-1 Predator 
drone, manufactured by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and a centerpiece 
of U.S. military and counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East and Africa, where 
hundreds of targeted drone strikes are now launched annually. Yet drone warfare 
is merely the leading edge of a broader worldwide trend toward more autonomous 
methods of warfighting. From South Korea’s armed sentry robots guarding the 
DMZ, to Israel’s ‘Iron Dome’ anti-munitions defense, to miniaturized lethal drones 
like the U.S. Army’s Switchblade, to long-range intercontinental drones like the 
U.K. Taranis and the U.S. X47-B, militaries around the world are investing in 
an increasingly automated future. Nor are such investments limited to weapons 
in the conventional sense. Military and intelligence agencies worldwide are 
developing increasingly sophisticated and autonomous software algorithms for 
use in cyberwarfare – conflicts between electronic agents in electronic space that 
nevertheless have the potential to inflict considerable human losses. Merging with 
both trends are advancements in algorithms for analysing massive datasets, which 
can potentially outperform human calculations of threat potential, target value, 
operational risk, mission cost, casualty estimates and other key strategic variables. 
Taken together, these developments represent a profound shift in our traditional 
understanding of the role of human beings in the conduct of war. In this paper I 
explore one of this shift’s most challenging ethical implications, namely, the risk 
of a significant moral deskilling of professional militaries, and a destabilization of 
associated ideals of military virtue.
The broader legal and ethical implications of this shift are immense in scope; they 
range from the compliance or non-compliance of automated warfighting systems 
with the laws of war and requirements of just war theory (Asaro 2008), to problems 
of moral and legal accountability for actions taken by autonomous agents (Sparrow 
2007), to the concern that automated methods of warfare are leading to greater 
‘moral disengagement’ among soldiers (Sharkey 2010; Royakkers and van Est 
2010). Together, these concerns mandate extensive and widespread critical inquiry 
and reflection on the automation of war; fortunately, this conversation is now well 
underway. In addition to scholarly articles by ethicists and legal experts, recent years 
have seen several high-profile books on related topics (Singer 2009; Arkin 2009; 
Krishnan 2009; Lin et. al. 2012). Major media outlets from The New York Times and 
The Wall Street Journal to online magazines like Wired and Slate regularly cover 
emerging developments in automated war technology and their political, legal and 
ethical ramifications. We are seeing the welcome emergence of a vigorous scholarly 
and public discourse on the legality and ethics of automated warfare, one likely to 
continue to evolve for decades as the possibilities, risks and benefits of automated 
systems become clearer. 
Yet one important subset of these concerns is likely to be less visible to public and 
political interests than the legalistic and utilitarian dilemmas presently driving the 
global conversation about the ethics of automated warfare. The subject to which I 
wish to call attention concerns the future of military virtue in an era of increasingly 
automated military action. My claim is that unless we take steps to secure that future, 
we face the possibility of a dangerous moral deskilling of the military profession. 
In what follows, I call the reader’s attention to the importance of habitual moral 
practice and skill acquisition as a precondition for the cultivation of military virtues, 
which are in turn critical to the standing of militaries as professional bodies with a 
distinct moral status recognized by combatants and civilians alike. I argue that by 
depriving soldiers of the opportunity to practice and develop the skills critical to the 
ethical use of military aggression, increasingly automated methods of warfighting 
could endanger the moral and professional status of the military vocation. In my 
conclusion I offer some speculations about how this outcome might be prevented.
2. MORAL PRACTICE AND MILITARY VIRTUE
Before I develop and support my claims, let me briefly explain what ‘virtue’ in 
the phrase ‘military virtue’ entails. The concept of virtue is rooted in classical 
traditions going as far back as the ancient Greek philosophies of Plato and Aristotle 
and, in the East, Confucian and Buddhist ethics. It endures today in the writings of 
contemporary virtue ethicists like Rosalind Hursthouse, Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Martha Nussbaum, and has found its way into various applied and professional codes 
of ethics, including business ethics, medical ethics, environmental and engineering 
ethics (Axtell and Olson 2012). Virtues are habituated states of a person’s character 
that reliably dispose their holders to excel in specific contexts of action, and to 
live well generally; so moral virtues are states of character that, once acquired, 
dispose their possessors to perform excellent moral actions of particular sorts, and, 
more broadly, to excel in moral living. Cardinal examples of moral virtues include 
wisdom, honesty, courage and moderation; others commonly recognized include 
loyalty, integrity, respect, honor, patience, compassion and benevolence, though this 
list is far from exhaustive. How particular virtues are defined and prioritized varies 
among cultures, historical periods and social roles; yet there is substantial overlap 
or convergence among diverse virtue traditions, indicating that the qualities seen 
as most supportive of human flourishing are, while not entirely universal, rooted in 
widely shared or similar human practices.
Because virtues are habituated rather than inborn, whether or not a person develops 
a particular virtue will largely depend on whether they engage repeatedly in the 
kinds of practices that cultivate it. The virtue of honesty, for example, can only be 
acquired through repeated practice of truth-telling. Initially, such practice requires 
guidance by a virtuous model, e.g., someone who is already honest. Over time, 
repeated practice can lead a person to see for themselves what honesty is, to see it as 
good in itself and to embody it better and more easily; a person who has cultivated 
the virtue of honesty is not only consistently inclined to tell the truth, they have 
learned how to excel at truth-telling in any situation that might arise: who to tell 
the truth to, when and where, in what way, and to what extent. Moral virtue thus 
requires more than good will and a steady desire to do the right thing – it requires the 
cultivation of a kind of practical wisdom that directs this right desire intelligently, 
perceiving and quickly adapting to the unique moral demands of each situation. In 
his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle named this practical wisdom phronesis; a sort 
of ‘über-virtue’ that orchestrates one’s individual qualities of moral excellence and 
integrates them within a complete and flourishing life (1984, 1140a25-30;1145a). 
The concept of virtue, then, picks out those aspects of persons that enable them 
to live as moral exemplars for others, qualities of character that we ourselves can 
strive to cultivate through the same sorts of repeated practice.
The role of virtue in military ethics has long been recognized, and a rich body of 
existing literature details the way in which virtues like courage, duty, integrity, 
honor, loyalty and service have historically been inseparable from the ideal of the 
good soldier (Olsthoorn 2011; Robinson 2007; Reichberg, Syse and Begby 2006; 
French 2003; Toner 2000). This does not mean that the enterprise of war itself can 
or should be seen as virtuous. Rather, ideals of virtuous military character, when 
exercised as normative expectations (not just indicators of supererogatory or heroic 
performance), express a society’s unwillingness to wholly exclude its warfighters 
from the broader responsibilities and benefits of the moral community.1 As I argue 
elsewhere (Vallor 2013), ideals of military virtue, when embedded in the practice 
and professional identity of military bodies, block the cultural displacement of war 
to an extra-moral realm where its conduct would be indistinguishable from criminal 
or mercenary violence. 
The ideal serves as a kind of contract between warfighters and the larger community, 
and when in force, it offers considerable benefits to soldiers and civilians alike. In 
addition to motivating restraint on the part of soldiers in inflicting civilian harms, it 
can motivate limited restraint between enemy combatants when each recognizes the 
other as a professional fighting with honor and moral purpose. It can also support 
1 The term ‘moral community’ here is left deliberately ambiguous in its reference; ideals of military 
virtue can be seen as ties that bind a soldier to the ethical life of her own nation or culture, or, in more 
cosmopolitan views, to the ethical life of the global human community of which she is a part.
the psychological integrity of soldiers themselves, by providing a moral context for 
what are, taken in themselves, brutal and deplorable actions. Finally, it preserves the 
sense of moral community between warfighters and civilians that allows returning 
soldiers to be welcomed home, and even valorized. To see the importance of this 
contingency, one need only be familiar with the starkly different experiences in the 
United States of veterans of World War II, treated to grand welcoming parades and 
to this day labelled “The Greatest Generation,” and veterans of the Vietnam War, 
who returned home to a largely indifferent and often hostile society no longer able 
to contextualize their service as virtuous.
Thus while war itself cannot be virtuous, because it characteristically impedes 
rather than supports human flourishing, humans who take on the burdens of military 
service can be - insofar as they aspire to fight only in the manner of an excellent 
human being. Of course, moral virtue is expressed differently according to the 
demands of particular circumstances; what compassion and courage call for in battle 
looks very different from what these demand in civic life. In writing on war and its 
apparent incompatibility with moral norms, Augustine wrote that precisely because 
war foments evil (“the desire for harming, the cruelty of revenge, the restless and 
implacable mind, the savageness of revolting, the lust for dominating”), it is all the 
more essential that soldiers cultivate the virtuous dispositions of compassion and 
benevolence to accompany them in battle, so that the “mutual bond of piety and 
justice” that constitutes common morality has not been irrevocably destroyed by 
the time that material conditions for peace return (Augustine 1994, 221-222). 
Military virtue, then, imperfect as its professional cultivation and practice may be, 
functions to keep warfighters morally continuous with society. It allows us to see 
ourselves, and the other, as worthy of membership in a moral community, even 
when engaged in conduct that is in itself destructive to moral community. When 
the professional cultivation of military virtue is not attempted or its aspirations 
are abandoned, as in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica, the aftermath of war is 
often precisely what we would expect from Augustine’s account: a shallow peace 
poisoned by deep distrust, resentment and fear lasting for generations. Survivors 
of such a moral calamity do not stop suffering when the bloodshed stops: they 
are burdened with the crippling social degradation that comes from the death of 
civic norms of trust, mercy, forgiveness, justice and goodwill. Such norms, once 
destroyed, are not easily reborn; while military virtue may not be able to shield 
them from assault, it can keep them on life support. For all of these reasons, then, it 
is essential to the mitigation of the harms of war that military virtue be preserved, 
both as a meaningful moral concept and as a practical and attainable commitment 
to ethical warfighting. In what follows I explain why the increasing automation of 
warfighting methods may jeopardize this imperative.
3. AUTOMATED WARFARE, VIRTUE AND 
THE MORAL DESKILLING OF MILITARY 
PRACTICE
Having offered reasons to take the concept of military virtue seriously, I turn to the 
primary burden of my argument: to show how increasingly automated methods of 
warfighting challenge the future of military virtue by potentially contributing to a 
moral deskilling of the military profession.  
First, let us consider the link between virtues and skills. Aristotle was clear that 
virtues and skills share many common features – both are acquired by habit and 
practice, both must be guided by intelligence, and both must be adapted to the 
demands of given situations. But he also reminds us that virtue is more than just 
skill or know-how; it is a state in which that know-how is reliably put into action 
when called for, and is done with the appropriate moral concern for what is good: 
“The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does [virtuous acts]; in the 
first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose 
them for their own sakes and thirdly his actions must proceed from a firm and 
unchangeable character” (1984, 1105a30-35). Someone could have moral skills in 
the sense of practical moral knowledge but fail to be virtuous because they are 
unreliable in acting upon this knowledge, or because they act well only for non-
moral reasons. Still, moral skills are a necessary if not a sufficient condition for 
moral virtue. Without the requisite cultivation of moral knowledge and skill, even 
a person who sincerely wishes to do well consistently and for its own sake will be 
unsuccessful. It follows that if the advancing automation of military conflict were to 
bring about a significant ‘moral deskilling’ of the profession, the future of military 
virtue would be gravely endangered.
What would a ‘moral deskilling’ of the military profession amount to, and how 
might the advancing automation of warfighting systems contribute to it? Deskilling 
is a familiar concept in the analysis of the social impact of technology; for example, 
we might think of the way in which the skills of machinists and other classes of 
mechanical labor were devalued by widespread factory adoption of automated 
machine tools (Braverman 1974). Or consider the worry that the professional work 
of highly skilled nurses is increasingly given over to a combination of less skilled 
aides and advanced medical monitoring and medication delivery technologies 
(Rinard 1996). However, the concept of deskilling has declined in academic usage 
in the last few decades, in large part because unlike the earlier automation of 
factory work, the information revolution has thus far seemed to deliver as much 
upskilling as deskilling –workers in many industries have been freed by computers 
to shift their duties from mindless tasks like filing, copying and collating to more 
challenging and knowledge-laden responsibilities. Yet some new applications in 
information technology may warrant renewed concerns about deskilling, including 
moral deskilling (Manders-Huits 2006). Whether any automated technology 
produces deskilling, then, is an empirical question that depends upon the particular 
context of use. Let us look more closely at the critical meaning of the concept, and 
how it may apply to the context of automated warfare.
The concept of deskilling has at least two critical implications. The first and most 
commonly discussed implication is that the deskilling of a given profession may 
decrease the socioeconomic value, autonomy and power enjoyed by workers, 
potentially causing them significant psychological and economic harm.  A second 
critical implication, the one I wish to highlight, is that at least for some professions, 
we may have reason to regret the loss of the professional context for cultivating the 
given skills because we think the skills themselves are intrinsically valuable. For 
example, many have mourned the declining skills of artistic handicraft lost to mass 
manufacture of ready-made objects (Roberts 2010), resulting in renewed interest 
in ‘handmade,’ ‘custom’ or ‘artisanal’ products. In this context, it is not only the 
economic welfare of the artisan that we value, and not only the quality of the end 
product, but also the connection between an artifact and a human whose artistic 
excellence and knowledge was responsible for its production. We think that it is 
good that humans are skilled at making beautiful and useful objects for their own 
living, and that even if machines could produce all such goods for us, it would be 
sad and regrettable if humans were no longer capable of doing the same.
I suggest that the intrinsic value of artisanal skills is not only paralleled but 
dwarfed by the intrinsic value of moral skills. The concept of moral deskilling 
is only rarely employed used in the sociological literature on technology, in part 
because sociologists tend to shy away from normative judgments of ethics, and 
in part because concerns about moral deskilling are sometimes associated with 
reactionary ‘moral panics’ in reaction to technological change – for example, 
worries in the 1920’s that the telephone would result in crippling social isolation 
and the unravelling of people’s capacities for moral interaction. However, the 
concept remains meaningful, and I suggest that it may have profound significance 
with respect to the professional impact of military automation. While deskilling 
has been recognized with respect to the threatened obsolescence of abilities such 
as those cultivated by military snipers (Townsend and Charles 2008), the more 
worrisome possibility of a moral deskilling of the military profession has yet to be 
widely acknowledged.
Consider the parallel drawn earlier with artisanal skills. Just as the widespread loss 
of such skills by humans would not be fully expunged by machines that produce 
comparable products, a widespread loss of moral skills in the context of military 
conduct would not be rendered insignificant by the emergence of machines that 
produce equivalent, or arguably even better outcomes. This fact has unfortunately 
been lost in the otherwise rich debate about the legal and ethical implications of 
automated warfare. A world in which humans involved in warfighting are no longer 
skilled in the moral conduct of war is a world in which the concept of ‘military 
virtue’ has no meaning. As I have argued elsewhere (2013), where this concept has 
lost its meaning, the recognition of soldiers as professionals devoted to the selfless 
service of the moral community is no longer possible.
A. AUTOMATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND MORAL 
DESKILLING
Methods of automated warfare may be divided between those involving cyber-
conflict, and those involving (directly or indirectly) the application of military force. 
Let’s first consider the latter, starting with the ongoing debate about autonomous and 
semi-autonomous weapons. Most of the literature on this subject has focused on the 
inability of weaponized robots and drone aircraft to act with the moral knowledge, 
restraint, compassion, discrimination, proportionality and accountability demanded 
by modern laws of war. A recent Human Rights Watch report on the topic states 
that their primary concern is the price civilians will pay for these inevitable ethical 
shortcomings of autonomous weapons systems (Human Rights Watch 2012, 1). But 
not only is this open to challenge from those with more optimistic projections for 
artificial moral intelligence (Arkin 2009), it remains silent on the human cost of no 
longer asking soldiers to cultivate and reliably exercise the same moral capacities. 
If the optimistic predictions of roboticists are anywhere near correct, we may be 
moving toward a future where humans start wars, oversee them, and suffer from 
them, but are no longer fighting them, in the concrete sense of making informed 
and morally reflective choices about who or what gets targeted, or when, in which 
circumstances, or with what degree of force. My claim is that there is a price to pay 
here even if civilians do not suffer more direct harm as a result.
Consider that the skill set for supervising, approving or vetoing the decisions of 
semi-autonomous robots seeking to apply lethal force will be much narrower than 
the skill set required for humans to make those moral decisions themselves. One 
reason involves the time constraints under which human supervisors of autonomous 
or semi-autonomous weapons will operate. Many scholars believe that the much-
touted principle of humans staying ‘on the loop,’ with veto power over system 
targeting or firing actions, will soon be rendered largely meaningless when the 
human operator is given only a fraction of a second to make the veto decision, as is 
the case with several systems already in operation (Human Rights Watch 2012). One 
of the key tactical advantages of autonomous weapons systems is that they can make 
and execute decisions far faster than humans can. These narrowing time horizons 
will likely preclude human operators from conducting substantive investigation of, 
or careful reflection upon, the morally salient features on the ground warranting the 
robotic application of force. This has already been acknowledged as a fundamental 
technical obstacle to humans remaining on the loop of engagements between 
unmanned combat fighters; the delay time injected by satellite communications is 
simply incompatible with the timescale of air combat (Sharkey 2012). 
Add to this the likelihood that human operators of semi-autonomous systems will be 
tasked with supervising dozens or hundreds of drone or robotic agents at one time, 
as described by the Swarms.org website for the U.S. military’s SWARMS initiative 
(Scalable sWarms of Autonomous Robots and Mobile Sensors), and the potential 
for moral deskilling becomes even more evident. We might be tempted to envision 
human supervisors of autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons systems as elite 
military judges chosen for their Solomonic wisdom and discretion in the ethical use 
of lethal force; but in reality they may have even less room for discretion and fewer 
degrees of decision freedom than air traffic controllers. What sort of moral skill set 
can we reasonably expect such practices to cultivate? And if moral skills in the use 
of military force are not cultivated at the level where force is applied, or even at the 
level where its application is being directly supervised, where will it be cultivated, 
and through what practices? 
That advances in automation will result in revolutionary shifts in the skills needed 
for modern warfighting is news to hardly anyone. In envisioning a future where 
thanks to advancing automation, “systems and equipment can deploy forward with 
little if any human presence unless required for acceptance,” the U.S. Air Force’s 
published “Flight Plan 2009-2047” for unmanned aerial systems acknowledges that 
“a key challenge to realizing the vision will be to develop and maintain the right 
skill sets of systems and operational software developers, mission directors and 
USAF leaders…leaders will also require different skills to employ air power that is 
largely non-human” (USAF 2009, 51). But nowhere in this plan is it acknowledged 
that military leaders traditionally are expected to exercise moral as well as technical 
and strategic skill in the use of weaponized systems; it is worth asking where 
those moral skills will be cultivated in a future of automated warfighting where 
“relatively few mission directors will be needed” and the skills needed to “prepare, 
launch and perform” combat operations have been shifted from the field of action 
to “technology development offices” (Ibid.).
One might object by pointing out that decisions to use military force are very 
rarely conducted under conditions conducive to deep moral reflection. Human 
soldiers already have to make snap judgments in the field under highly demanding 
constraints, and even those decisions that can be reviewed by commanders are 
rarely evaluated under ideal conditions. Yet it remains the case that a remarkable 
amount of moral knowledge and skill is presupposed by the human ability to 
keep a military operation involving lethal force from descending into utter moral 
chaos. Not every commanding officer has this kind of knowledge and skill, or even 
adequate exposure to the practices needed for its cultivation; but if no one in the 
chain of command has it, the chances of moral catastrophe are greatly increased. 
Neither sound rules of engagement nor advance commitments to ‘human values’ 
will prevent disaster if there is no one who can apply them in morally expert ways. 
Indeed, moral virtue entails precisely the kind of expertise that allows us to 
quickly perceive the right course of action even in unpredictable or rapidly 
changing circumstances, without laborious calculations or clumsy recourse to 
formal principles. Yet according to many roboticists, a chief advantage of future 
autonomous weapons systems is that once programmed, they will not need human 
experts to tell them how to avoid morally catastrophic uses of force, begging the 
question of whether human soldiers will still be expected to cultivate that expertise 
for themselves. Remember that repeated moral practice is essential to the cultivation 
of moral virtue. How might our moral development suffer from transferring the 
most critical of those practices to machines, whose response times and cognitive 
architecture will be sufficiently unlike our own to prevent them from serving as 
models of virtue for us?  
Furthermore, if the advance of autonomous weaponry were to lead to a significant 
‘moral deskilling’ of the military profession, how would that impact the cultivation 
of military virtue, which as I claimed earlier, performs a critical function in 
mitigating the tendency of wars to produce lasting civic devastation? For the sake 
of argument, let us assume with roboticists like Ron Arkin (2009) that the most 
optimistic predictions regarding the emergence of artificial moral intelligence 
will be realized, and that in the not so distant future, human soldiers are no longer 
regularly called upon to judge when lethal military force is warranted and when 
it is not, or how it should be applied. We have handed over these judgments to 
robotic systems without any of our defective dispositions to anger, vengeance, bias, 
fear and laziness, and with computational abilities that keep their margins of error 
well below the best-trained of human soldiers. Without opportunities to exercise 
the skilled moral judgments that the expert application of lethal force requires, 
what level of ‘moral deskilling’ of professional soldiers may result, and with what 
consequences for the cultivation of military courage, honor or compassion? 
One might interrupt to remind me that the United States has issued a new policy 
directive ensuring that, as the title of Wired magazine’s coverage ably summed 
up, ‘A Human Will Always Decide When a Robot Kills You’ (Ackerman 2012). 
This new commitment to reject fully autonomous targeting and lethal engagement 
should not preclude us from seriously entertaining our thought experiment for 
three reasons. First, this directive expires in ten years (Carter 2012), well before 
most scholars expect reliable technology for fully autonomous lethal robots to be 
available. Second, it binds only U.S. armed forces, and in no way precludes the 
development of such systems for other markets. Third, it does not change the above-
noted fact that even semi-autonomous weaponry is rapidly shrinking the window 
for decisions on target selection and engagement below the timescale of human 
decision-making. Add to this the recognized ‘automation bias’ that leads humans to 
trust computer judgments over their own (Asaro 2009, 22), and the United States’ 
promise to preserve human control over lethal means of warfighting may seem less 
meaningful. Well, then, so much the worse for underperforming, unpredictable and 
irrational human soldiers, and so much the better for programmable, precise and 
obedient killer robots, say roboticists like Arkin (2010). They may be right, and 
from a consequentialist point of view, there is no question that reductions in civilian 
casualties as a result of increased precision and reduced error rates, if realized, will 
have to factor into any moral assessment of the use of autonomous lethal weapons.
But the consequentialist equation cannot be the whole story. We must also consider 
the value of the moral skills that make military virtue and professionalism possible 
and what their loss might mean for professional soldiers and civilians alike. Before 
offering some concluding thoughts on how their loss might be prevented, let us 
move beyond automated weapons systems of the traditional sort, and extend our 
inquiry to automated methods of cyber-conflict.
B. BEYOND AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS: ALGORITHMIC 
AUTONOMY, CYBER-CONFLICT AND MORAL DESKILLING
The role of automated systems in warfighting is not limited to drones, robots or 
autonomous defense munitions. The software algorithms that enable autonomous or 
semi-autonomous operation of such systems can also be used to automate military 
or intelligence decision processes that may or may not involve the deployment 
of autonomous weapons. Consider, for example, a recent paper on an algorithm 
developed at West Point’s Network Science Center and funded by the U.S. Army 
Research Office for potential use in ranking the most valuable targets in a terrorist 
network (Shakarian et. al. 2012). The paper’s authors suggest that the performance 
of the algorithm, which tends to select mid-level lieutenants in a terrorist network as 
more valuable targets than high-level commanders, may be superior to independent 
human assessments of target value. Granting targeting authority to such an 
algorithm could lead to an operation involving an automated drone strike on the 
target, but it could also motivate a Special Forces assault or attempt at capture. Yet 
even without the use of automated weapons, such an operation would embody the 
trend toward automated warfighting. The moral implications of letting a computer 
program decide which individual humans deserve to be military targets are starkly 
apparent, but again, setting aside obvious worries about the justice of automating 
such a decision, consider its additional implications for human cultivation of moral 
skills, knowledge and virtue. Imagine that we come to rely upon algorithms of this 
kind for military and intelligence targeting, but also for determining, for example, 
whether killing or capturing a particular target is more ethical and prudent, and 
the best operational design, occasion or ordnance for doing so. What kind of moral 
character would be required for military officers and other personnel to successfully 
support such an operation? Would any moral skills or qualities of note be required? 
If so, what would they be? In what actions would they be cultivated, or exercised? Or 
would soldiers and mission leaders be called upon strictly as technical specialists, 
tasked and trusted with nothing more than ensuring informational integrity in the 
communication of algorithmic decisions down the chain of command?
Such questions clearly extend into the realm of military operations involving no 
direct deployment of force whatsoever, such as cyber-warfare, or more broadly, 
cyber-conflict. Consider an algorithm that is programmed to defend government 
networks from intrusion, and to launch a counter-attack upon any electronic system 
or network it identifies as the host of the intruding informational agent. Set aside 
for now the technical questions about how to effectively design such an algorithm, 
such that it does not frequently mistake benign interactions for a cyberattack, or 
misidentify the agent responsible for an attack. To run parallel with our thought 
experiment about autonomous robots and other weapons systems, let us assume, just 
for the sake of argument, that we will soon develop sufficiently advanced artificial 
intelligence such that we can trust such algorithms to select, as justice requires, a 
proportional and discriminating response to any given cyberattack. What skills and 
virtues would be required of the human operators and supervisors of a cyberdefense 
system driven by such algorithms?
Let us say that we adopt the policy that such systems must maintain a human ‘on the 
loop,’ who in each case is tasked with approving or rejecting the system’s request to 
launch a counterattack. Even setting aside the ‘automation bias’ mentioned above, 
which can already predispose us to defer to computer decisions (Asaro 2009), 
how would such a supervisor ever become qualified to make that judgment, in a 
professional setting where the decision process under review is no longer regularly 
exercised by humans in the first place? An expert supervisor of another’s decision, 
in order to be worthy of the authority to override it, must have acquired expertise in 
making decisions of the very same or a similar kind. The requisite skills and wisdom 
that constitute such expertise could only be acquired, according to most theories of 
expertise, by having repeatedly and habitually practiced the actions in question, 
with an opportunity to learn from mistakes and successes, and to receive corrective 
feedback from others who already have the expertise one seeks to acquire. Where 
will the human supervisors of automated cyber-conflict acquire such practice, and 
the expertise in the proportionate and discriminating use of cyber-power that it 
alone can engender? And what are the implications for human beings engaged in 
cyber-conflict, and for those impacted by cyber-conflicts, if they do not?
4. CONCLUSIONS
Of course, the reduction of human decision-making to mechanistic, formulaic 
or quasi-algorithmic processes can happen by means other than technological 
automation. We can easily conceive of military environments in which soldiers and 
officers are encouraged to eschew complex moral reasoning in favor of legalistic 
templates, decision-trees and other formal mechanisms of reducing the cognitive 
burdens (and freedoms) of human judgment.2 Thus any ‘moral deskilling’ of the 
military profession need not be essentially linked to advances in the technological 
automation of war – it may have other causes as well. That said, the considerations 
above make it clear that advances in technological automation may greatly exacerbate 
any existing defects in the ability of today’s military bodies to cultivate moral 
skills and virtues among their members and within their leadership ranks. What 
can be done to prevent such an eventuality? One option, of course, is a wholesale 
reversal of the shift toward automated methods of warfighting. While theoretically 
possible and perhaps even ideal, the expedience of such methods makes this reply 
of questionable utility. Are there other options? 
Perhaps military institutions will compensate for the loss of moral skills in combat 
personnel by instead cultivating them in the software engineers responsible for 
programming automated systems to act ethically. But this does not answer the 
question of how, or through what new professional practices, software engineers 
could gain the needed moral expertise. Professional education would not be 
sufficient - the study of ethics textbooks, articles on just war theory or legal briefs 
on international laws of war do not by themselves enable skillful moral action or 
virtue– only repeated practice of the activities those books describe can produce the 
requisite capacities. Wargames or virtual-reality simulators might aim to engender 
in programmers and supervisors of automated systems the required habits and 
talents of moral discernment; but it is highly questionable whether simulations 
would carry the situational richness and moral gravity that produces genuine virtue. 
Perhaps the best option is to restrict the deployment of automated methods of 
warfare to just those contexts in which human judgments are consistently and 
gravely inadequate and lead to morally intolerable error – while preserving robust 
opportunities elsewhere for, and expectations of, human soldiers to cultivate and 
exercise moral virtue in the conduct of war. This policy could be adopted alongside 
other uses of automated systems that create positive opportunities for moral 
2  Thanks to Don Howard for pointing this out in personal correspondence.
upskilling of military professionals. For example, rather than developing artificial 
moral intelligence that supplants human decision-making in the use of lethal 
force, artificial intelligence systems might instead be usefully deployed to provide 
soldiers with enhanced information about morally salient features of the battlefield, 
or to offer improved feedback concerning the alignment of soldiers’ habits and 
decision patterns with norms of military honor, courage and restraint. However, 
such ethically constructive policies are unlikely to be pursued until and unless 
military leaders, educators, officers and the designers of automated systems jointly 
acknowledge the importance of preserving in military practice a developmental 
path for moral skills and virtues. 
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